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INTRODUCTION
As civil governments with territorial claims to natural resources like
land, air and water, Indian tribes have public trust responsibilities to pro-
tect their citizens' related interests on the same theory applied to state
governments.' Like states, tribal governments discharge their obligations
by exercising inherent sovereignty independently and in conjunction with
the federal government. In terms of managing environmentally harmful
activities in Indian country, tribes can develop regulatory programs sepa-
rately or in partnership with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) through particular state-like regulatory roles.
* Director, Tribal Environmental Law Project, Northern Plains Indian Law Cen-
ter, University of North Dakota School of Law, and Randy H. Lee Associate Professor of
Law. I thank Tim Richard and Crystal Ovsak for their able research assistance supporting
this Article, and Jennifer Scannell and Jeetander Dulani for their help in editing and source
checking.
1. See, e.g., State of California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 29 Cal.3d 210 (Cal. 1981)
(state public trust); See also Berrey v. ASARCO, Inc., 439 E3d 636 (10th Cir. 2006) (Qua-
paw Tribe asserted public trust responsibility to address mining contamination).
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Either programmatic approach requires substantial commitments of
tribal and federal staff time and resources necessary for creating required
administrative infrastructure. Both can also trigger difficult legal chal-
lenges on the scope of inherent tribal sovereignty and the extent of Indian
country, which can have dramatic impacts on other important tribal in-
terests. Litigation risks and large resource needs have stunted the growth
of tribal environmental programs, but Indian country health and welfare
risks do not wait for effective regulation.
Environmental citizen suits offer tribal governments an attractive
tool for protecting some of their interests without the effort and risk in-
volved in program development. These congressionally authorized federal
claims can force EPA to take important mandatory actions and force fa-
cilities to comply with applicable pollution requirements. A citizen
plaintiff needs no independent basis for controlling the actor, so a tribe
need not show inherent sovereignty over a non-Indian polluter to prevail.
And a defendant may not avoid liability by arguing it is located outside
Indian country. That avoids so-called Indian country diminishment cases,
and also extends a measure of tribal control into aboriginal territories
ceded long ago.
This Article suggests that federal environmental citizen suits can
serve tribal sovereignty interests without presenting the legal risks tribes
face when they attempt direct regulation of non-Indians. Section I briefly
describes governmental regulatory roles tribes may play in the implemen-
tation of federal environmental law and policy. Section II overviews the
conceptual and procedural framework for tribal claims as "citizens." Sec-
tion III argues that in bringing environmental citizen suits, tribal
governments exercise their inherent sovereign power and responsibility to
protect the health and welfare of tribal citizens and the quality of the In-
dian country environment. Section IV concludes that, while suits directed
at one facility cannot and should not replace comprehensive tribal pro-
grams, they offer concrete benefits to tribes without risking adverse
judicial decisions on the scope of tribal sovereignty and Indian country.
I. TRIBAL GOVERNMENTAL ROLES IN THE
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEM
EPA's Indian program began developing in 1973, just three years af-
ter the modern era of federal environmental law began. The federal
government's broad powers arising from historic relations with indige-
nous nations implied that general federal laws applied to Indian country,'
2. See James M. Grijalva, The Origins of EPA's Indian Program, 15 KAN.J L. & PUB.
POL. 191 (2006) (examining historical antecedents to EPA's 1984 Indian Policy).
3. See Federal Power Comm'n v.Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99,116 (1960).
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presumably including the federal environmental laws. The modern envi-
ronmental laws were structured on a new federal-state relationship called
cooperative federalism, which envisioned a structured partnership ac-
knowledging both the national interest in environmental management
and states' historic responsibility over public health and welfare.'
But cooperative federalism as originally designed faltered in Indian.
country. In the early 1970s the Supreme Court's jurisprudence indicated
"State laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians or an Indian res-
ervation except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws
shall apply."6 The early environmental laws were silent on Indian country
implementation, 7 suggesting federal reliance on state program implemen-
tation would leave a regulatory gap in the circle of national protection.
EPA's practical stopgap response was direct federal implementation; EPA
would not delegate Indian country programs to states
Direct federal implementation, however, was the old paradigm for
federal management of Indian affairs. The modern era of Indian policy,
which began about the same time EPA was created, centered on tribal
self-determination.9 EPA embraced self-determination as soon as any fed-
eral agency, creating a tribal regulatory role animating federal air quality
requirements in 1974.10 That role mirrored the program opportunity
4. See, e.g., Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985)
(Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian
Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); Davis
v. Morton, 469 E2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972) (National Environmental Policy Act).
5. Cf. ROBERTV PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND
POLICY 495 (2003) (describing the impact of the 1970 Clean Air Act's federal-state design
on modern environmental law); COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY: THE FIRST ANNUALJ REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 73-
74 (Aug. 1970) (describing the new "regional" approach to air pollution control).
6. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1973). See,
e.g.,Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (barring state law from Indian country as an
unacceptable interference with federal-tribal relations); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789
(1945) (noting "the policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is
deeply rooted in the Nation's history");Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (barring
on-reservation state action that "[ilnfringed on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them").
7. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act of,1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 5 2,
86 Star. 886 (1972) (defining Indian tribes as municipalities but making no other reference
to Indian country).
8. Final Rules, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 38 Fed. Reg.
13,528, 13,530 (May 22, 1973) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 125.2(a)(2)).
9. See, e.g., Special Message to Congress on Indian Affairs, 213 Pub. Papers 564
(July 8, 1970); Indian Education Act, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972).
10. Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (Dec.
5, 1974) (codified at 40 C.ER. § 52.21(c)(3)(i)).
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available to states. A broader conception of state-like regulatory roles for
tribes was captured in official EPA policies in 198011 and 1984.2
Congress followed EPA's lead in the mid-1980s. EPA was directed
to treat tribes "as states" in 1986 amendments to the Safe Drinking Water
Act 13 and the Superfund law,'4 1987 amendments to the Clean Water
Act," and 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act. 6 Tribes with treat-
ment-as-a-state or TAS status were eligible to implement federal
environmental programs in Indian country, and their program decisions
became federally enforceable on pollution sources both inside and outside
tribal territories. 17 Within federal dictates, TAS gave effect to tribal value
judgments on the environmental quality of Indian country, thus helping
protect the health and welfare of tribal citizens and others living in Indian
country.
Tribal TAS program development has begun in earnest for some
tribes, but effective Indian country regulation is still a distant hope for
most. Practical constraints like time, money and institutional inertia affect
tribes and EPA. Overlaying those not insignificant barriers are the politi-
cal and legal landmines associated with the issue of tribal regulation of
non-Indians.
The Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Montana v. United States"s said
tribes retain inherent sovereignty over non-members whose Indian coun-
try activities threaten tribal health or welfare, but in 25 years the Court
has never decided in favor of a tribe on that basis. Instead, it has consis-
tently rejected tribes' claims across a broad range of subjects, including the
power to prescribe general zoning requirements,19 impose wildlife man-
agement restrictions,"° tax businesses serving tribal citizens and other
11. EPA Policy for Program Implementation on Indian Lands (Dec. 19, 1980) (on file
with author).
12. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Policy for the Administration of Environ-
mental Programs on Indian Reservations, (November 8, 1984) http://www.epa.gov/indian/
1984.htm [hereinafter 1984 Indian Policy].
13. 1986 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 99-339, Title III,
302(a), 100 Stat. 665 (June 19,1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 300j-11).
14. 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
Title II, § 207(e), 100 Stat. 1706 (Oct. 17, 1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9626).
15. 1987 Clean Water Act Amendments, Pub.L. No. 100-4, Title V, § 506, 101
Stat.76 (Feb. 4, 1987) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1377).
16. 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 107(d), 104 Stat. 2464
(Nov. 15, 1990, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7601.
17. E.g., Nance v. EPA, 645 F2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming EPA's approval of a
tribal air quality redesignation despite objections over its impacts on off-reservation pollu-
tion sources).
18. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
19. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989).
20. Montana, 450 U.S. 544.
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reservation residents and visitors,2 decide wrongful death cases arising
from car accidents on reservation roads,22 and decide property damage
cases arising from the on-reservation conduct of state officials.23 In each
case, the Court acknowledged the general subject matter implicated le-
gitimate tribal welfare interests, but found these interests inadequately
impacted by the on-reservation activities of non-members. Simple threats
to tribal health or welfare were insufficient; the real question was whether
the Court felt tribal control over the activity was necessary to protect
tribal self-government.
The cases offer little guidance on that famously indeterminate test.
It ostensibly respects tribal sovereignty, counseling tribal control wherever
self-government is hindered. Yet, the Court seems to expect evidentiary
proof of an actual, direct and significant connection with the specific
non-Indian activity at issue. That requirement differs starkly from the def-
erential standard of review more commonly applied to state and federal
legislative determinations of the public interest. Curiously, the Court has
shown little interest in the tribes' views as represented by the legislative
judgments underlying the cases. Nor does the Court hesitate to substitute
its contrary interpretations of tribal interests, often influenced by the un-
proven assumption that state governmental mechanisms can or do
adequately protect tribal interests.
These multiple red flags have not been lost on tribes considering
environmental program development, nor on the EPA who must approve
those programs. EPA's Indian program decisions have frequently prevailed
in the lower courts,24 but the Supreme Court has yet to review one. The
Court's sole Indian country environmental case offered no guidance on
the scope of inherent tribal sovereignty. But the result and rationale of
that case gave tribes and EPA pause nonetheless. The Court upheld state
regulation of an on-reservation landfill owned and operated by a four-
county municipal waste district, concluding the landfill's location was no
longer Indian country subject to federal (and tribal) control.2 Congress
diminished the size of the reservation in 1894, the Court reasoned, when
it ratified the tribe's agreement to sell certain reservation lands including
the landfill property.
21. Atkinson Trading Post v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
22. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
23. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
24. See, e.g., City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996) (inclusion
of tribal water quality conditions in federal discharge permit); Administrator, State of Ari-
zona v. EPA, 151 E3d 1205 (9th Cir. 1998) (tribal air quality redesignation); Montana v.
EPA, 137 F3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998) (tribal water quality standards);Arizona Public Service
Comm'n v. EPA, 211 E3d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (tribal air quality redesignation);Wiscon-
sin v. EPA, 266 E3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001) (tribal water quality standards).
25. South Dakota v.Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998).
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Many tribal advocates perceive the Court's diminishment theory
and its Montana jurisprudence as a two-pronged attack on tribal self-
government over non-Indians. The scope of both inherent tribal power
and tribal territory are shrinking. Unpredictability and apprehension have
had a pernicious chilling effect on tribal program development. In that
context, environmental citizen suits filed by tribal governments offer a
safer alternative to protect tribal health and welfare interests, and thus
tribal self-government interests.
II.TRIBAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS THROUGH CITIZEN SUITS
The federal environmental laws provide significant federal enforce-
ment powers and generally preserve states' pre-existing enforcement
authority. Nonetheless, in every major federal environmental law enacted
or amended since 1970, Congress has included provisions authorizing
civil suits by private individuals and non-federal entities seeking enforce-
ment of the law.26 These "citizen suits" may be directed at EPA for failing
to perform duties mandated by Congress and at facilities alleged to be in
violation of applicable requirements. Essentially, Congress vested those
who will ultimately bear the consequences of poorly implemented na-
tional environmental policies with tools for addressing them. 27
That tool seems especially appropriate for tribal governments re-
sponsible for serving their citizens' health and welfare interests. The
absence of effective regulatory programs in Indian country arguably
makes legal violations more likely to occur and less likely to be prose-
cuted by states or EPA. EPA has officially acknowledged its trust
responsibility to protect tribal health and welfare 8 and to enforce the law
in Indian country,29 but Indian country has seen few direct federal pro-
26. See Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2000); En-
dangered Species Act (ESA) § 11(g), 16 U.S.C. 5 1540(g) (2000); Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (2000); Marine Protection, Re-
search, and Sanctuaries Act § 105(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2000); Deepwater Ports Act
§ 16, 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (2000); Clean Water Act (CWA) § 505, 33 U.S.C. 5 1365 (2000);
Clean Air Act (CAA) § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000); Resource Conservation Recovery
Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C. 5 6972 (2000); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) §310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2000); Emergency Planning
and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) § 326, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (2000); Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA) § 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2000); Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act § 23, 43 U.S.C. 5 1349(a) (2000).
27. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 E2d 692, 700 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (finding the CAA citizen suit provision "a deliberate choice by Congress to
widen citizen access to the courts, as a supplemental and effective assurance that the Act
would be implemented and enforced").
28. 1984 Indian Policy, supra note 12, at 3.
29. Id. at 4.
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grams and even fewer enforcement actions.3" Tribal TAS programs are
growing, but it will take more time and financial resources from both
EPA and tribes before tribes fill the regulatory gap in partnership with
EPA. Until that time, tribal citizen suits offer programmatic and facility-
specific options for protecting important tribal interests.
A. Tribes' Eligibility for Bringing Citizen Suits
1.Tribes as "Persons" Under the Environmental Statutes
The major regulatory and remedial environmental statutes uni-
formly authorize "any person" to act as a private attorney general by
bringing civil suit seeking enforcement of statutory and administrative
requirements.3' Deputized persons include natural persons, legal persons
such as partnerships and corporations, and state and federal governmental
entities.32 But the statutory definitions of "person" do not similarly in-
clude tribal governments. Nor are citizen suit provisions included in the
statutory TAS provisions, although arguably EPA's TAS regulations opened
the door to tribal CAA citizen suits.33
Tribes are nonetheless able to bring citizen suits, so long as they are
willing to suffer certain indignities. In the pre-TAS era, Congress often
30. On occasion, however, tribal health concerns and the trust responsibility can
motivate EPA to act. See, e.g., Consent Decree and Final Judgment Among the United
State of America and the Sac and Fox Nation and Tenneco Oil Co., (CIV-96-017-C)
(WD. Ok. 1996) (SDWA action brought by EPA and the Department of the Interior on
behalf of the Tribe for underground water contamination caused by oil and gas mining on
and near tribal lands); John M. Glionna, Poisoned River Threatens Tribal Heritage, Los ANGE-
LEs TIMES, Apr. 22, 2000, at Al. (describing the Washoe Tribe's successful effort to convince
EPA to declare an abandoned mine contaminating tribal waters as a federal Superfund
site).
31. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (g) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (CAA); 42 U.S.C.
6972(a) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (CERCLA); 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a) (EPCRA); 42
U.S.C. § 300j-8(a) (SDWA).
32. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (CAA); 42 U.S.C.
6903(15) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (CERCLA); 42 U.S.C. § 11049(7) (EPCRA);
42 U.S.C. § 300f(12) (SDWA).
33. Unlike other statutory TAS provisions, the CAA left to EPA responsibility for
determining which CAA programs were appropriate for tribal treatment as a state. 42
U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2). EPA identified nearly all CAA programs as appropriate. Tribal Air
Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 7254 (Feb. 12, 1998) (amending 40 C.FR. pts. 9, 35, 49, 50 and 81).
EPA specifically exempted the provision authorizing citizen suits against states following
comments objecting that including the provision might constitute an administrative waiver
of tribal sovereign immunity. Id. at 7260-61. Arguably, then, a tribe's CAA TAS status does
not render it vulnerable as a citizen suit defendant, but does qualify it as a citizen suit
plaintiff.
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
defined Indian tribes as municipalities. 4 Municipalities are included as
persons under those statutes, so tribes willing to be labeled as state subdi-
visions for this purpose could bring citizen suit. That option is not
available under the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know
Act (EPCRA), the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability
Act (CERCLA), or the Clean Air Act (CAA), so tribes impacted by their
violations may be forced to sue as "organizations" representing their
members' interests.3" Alternatively, a lead tribal official could sue as an in-
dividual representing tribal citizens' interests.
3 6
2. Tribes' Standing to Sue Violators
An advantage of citizen suits over TAS programs is they do not re-
quire a showing of tribal regulatory jurisdiction over the defendant. They
do require a plaintiff show constitutional standing to bring the case inde-
pendent of Congress' authorization of citizen claims.37 Environmental
organizations assert their members' interests to satisfy standing. 38 Presuma-
bly, the tribe's governmental status gives it authority to represent its
citizen's interests in a similar fashion.39
The tribal government would need to show some of its citizens
have suffered a cognizable legal injury, caused by the defendant's allegedly
illegal action, which can be redressed by a court's favorable ruling.4" Cog-
nizable injuries include harm to aesthetic, conservational, and recreational
interests,41 which arguably include tribal cultural uses of the natural envi-
ronment. The Warm Springs Tribes had standing to challenge allegedly
illegal actions on a tributary of the John Day River where tribal citizens
possessed treaty-protected fishing rights in the river.1
2
34. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1362(10) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. 5 6903(13) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C.
300f(10) (SDWA).
35. Compare Public Interest Research Group of N. J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Termi-
nals Inc., 913 F2d 64 (3rd Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 1109 (1991).
36. See, e.g., Scott v. City of Hammond; 741 F2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984) (CWA citizen
suit filed by state attorney general).
37. See Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1992).
38. See, e.g., Powell Dufflyn, 913 F.2d at 70 (finding organizational standing where
members have individual standing, their interests are germane to the organization's pur-
pose, and their individual participation is not required); Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 747
F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding environmental group did not have standing where it did
not allege that its members had suffered an injury-in-fact caused by defendant's discharge).
39. Compare United States Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992) (addressing
substantive issues presented by Ohio's citizen suit against a federal facility with no refer-
ence to questions of standing).
40. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
41. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,738 (1972).
42. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 E Supp. 1534, 1538 (D. Oregon
1996).
[VOL. 12:33
TheiTribal Sovereign as Citizen
Although cognizable injuries are broad, they cannot be speculative.
Citizens must allege injuries that are imminent both temporally 3 and spa-
tially.44 The injury must also be distinct from the legal violation that is the
subject of the citizen suit. The plaintiff must show the permit or standard
violation caused a cognizable environmental harm to have standing.4 5 Inju-
ries resulting from wholly past violations are insufficient 6 unless recurrence
can be reasonably expected.47
3. Other Procedural Issues
Congress vested substantial authority in EPA to ensure the federal en-
vironmental laws are faithfully executed and enforced. Citizen suits
extended some of that authority to so-called "private attorneys general."
Citizen suits also put the public in a position to insist EPA follow Congres-
sional mandates. However, Congress intended that citizen suits supplement
rather than supplant governmental enforcement. So Congress imposed two
procedural hurdles citizen suit plaintiffi must overcome before federal
courts will exercise jurisdiction over their claims.
The first hurdle is notice. Typically, the plaintiff is required to notify
the defendant and relevant agencies of an impending suit, and may not file
for a specified time (often 60 to 90 days) after giving notice. 8 The theory is
that the notice may induce the defendant to come into compliance volun-
tarily within the notice period. Alternatively, the plaintiff's announced
intention might goad EPA into taking action."0 Either way, the plaintiff's
notice may by itself obviate the need for citizen enforcement. Hence, courts
43. E.g., Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572-73 (finding citizen allegations of
"someday" intentions to return to international areas allegedly affected by challenged ac-
tion insufficient).
44. E.g., Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 887-89 (1990) (finding general
allegations of citizen uses of thousands to millions of acres of lands "in the vicinity" of the
challenged action insufficient).
45. See, e.g., NRDC v. Texaco, 2 F.3d 493, 505 (3d Cir. 1993); Powell Duffryn, 913
F.2d at 71-73; Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 747 F2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1984).
46. E.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 523 U.S. 83,107-09 (1998) (finding
an order for civil penalties and injunctive relief would not redress asserted injuries plaintiff
suffered in the past from company's failure to file required toxic inventory reports).
47. E.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt'l Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 187-88
(2000) (holding citizens may have standing to seek civil penalties for violations ongoing at
the time of the complaint or that could continue in the future).
48. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(A) (CAA); 42
U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(A) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d)(1) (CERCLA); 42 U.S.C.
§ 11046(d)(1) (EPCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(b)(1)(A) (SDWA).
49. E.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 88 (dismissing citizen suit because defendant filed
eight years of required toxic inventory reports during the notice period).
50. Perhaps that result could be assisted by a tribal plaintiff's reminder to federal
agencies of their trust responsibilities for tribal health and welfare and the quality of the
Indian country environment.
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usually interpret the notice requirements as jurisdictional, and dismiss plain-
tiflf who fail to comply" The Pueblo of San Juan was excluded from a
CWA citizen suit for failing to give notice, even though its co-plaintiffl had
done so. 2 In limited circumstances, a citizen suit may be filed immediately
after notice for substantial emergencies, 3 or releases of toxic or hazardous
pollutants. 4
A second procedural hurdle for citizen suit plaintifl is referred to as
the government enforcement bar. Otherwise legitimate citizen suits are
barred if EPA "has commenced and is diligently. prosecuting a civil action"
seeking compliance for the same violation asserted in the citizen suit."5 A
government prosecution may be commenced during the notice period, but
once the citizen suit complaint is filed, later enforcement action does not
bar the suit. 6 The prosecution bar also applies to state enforcement actions
taken consistent with federal program requirements. 7 It generally does not
apply to administrative enforcement actions" unless Congress so specifies. 9
51. See, e.g., Hallstrom v.Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 32 (1989) (failure to comply
with 60 day notice requirement of RCRA citizen suit provision required dismissal of suit);
South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 E Supp. 118 (D.S.C. 1978) (failure to comply
with 60 day notice requirement of CWA citizen suit provision for two of three facilities
required dismissal of suit as to those facilities).
52. New Mexico Citizens for Clean Air and Water v. Espanola Mercantile Co., Inc. 72
F3d 830,833-34 (10th Cir. 1996). In a different CWA case, the court found notice given by
co-plaintiffl was sufficient for the Warm Springs Tribes' suit. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n,
940 F Supp. at 1539.
53. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(A) (imminent and substantial endangerment under
RCRA); Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F2d 1343, 1351-52 (2d Cir. 1991) (notice and delay
requirements for commencing citizen suits under RCRA and CWA did not apply where
plaintiffs alleged both hazardous and nonhazardous waste claims in a single "hybrid" complaint).
54. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (violations of national performance standards
for new sources or toxic pollutants requirements under CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(A)
(emissions of hazardous air pollutants under CAA).
55. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (CAA); 42
U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d)(2) (CERCLA); 42 U.S.C.
11046(d)(2) (EPCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(b)(1)(B) SDWA).
56. E.g.,Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Koch Refining Co., 681 F Supp. 609 (D.
Minn. 1988).
57. See, e.g., City of Heath v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 834 F Supp. 971 (S.D. Ohio 1993)
(barring RCRA citizen suit for alleged violation of federal provision superseded by state law
pursuant to RCRA delegation to the state), 949 F2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991) (barring CWA
citizen suit because of state's diligent enforcement action); Atlantic States Legal Found. v.
Tyson Foods, Inc. 682 E Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (barring CWA citizen suit because of
state's diligent enforcement action).
58. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 834 E2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1987) (nonju-
dicial enforcement action); Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., Inc., 592 F2d 215 (3d Cir. 1979)
(state administrative hearing board proceeding); Coal. for Health Concern v. LWD, Inc., 834
F Supp. 953 (WD. Ky. 1993) (EPA and state administrative orders).
59. See 33 U.S.C. § 131 9 (g)(6) (federal and state administrative actions to enforce
CWA permits or CWA requirements bar civil penalty actions brought via citizen suits); 42
U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)(iv) (RCRA bar is triggered by EPA's issuance of an administrative
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Tribal governments whose suits are precluded by government prose-
cution may still participate in the compliance process. The statutes generally
provide would-be citizen plaintiffs the opportunity to intervene as a matter
of right in enforcement actions. 60 Conversely, EPA may choose not to initi-
ate a separate enforcement action and intervene as a matter of right in the
citizen suit.
61
B. Suits Against EPA for Non-performance
One of the two categories of citizen suits of potential value to tribes
protecting sovereignty interests are those brought directly against EPA.
Congress placed primary responsibility for implementing most of the major
environmental laws on EPA, and vested the Agency with significant discre-
tion to get the job done effectively. Congress also mandated the Agency
take certain actions, and waived its immunity from suit as an incentive.
2
Citizens were authorized to sue the Administrator for failing to perform
statutorily imposed non-discretionary duties. 3
EPA's mandatory duties generally implicate programmatic actions
rather than facility-specific or pollution-specific actions. Nonetheless, they
can serve tribal sovereignty interests directly by fostering self-government
opportunities and indirectly by ensuring effective management of activities
affecting tribal health and welfare interests.
The duties directly serving tribal self-government interests implement
the Agency's Indian program. For example, Congress mandated EPA prom-
ulgate regulations treating tribes as states within 18 months of amending
the CWA64 and the CAA.6s Legal and political complexities helped EPA
order to perform an RI/FS or removal action under CERCLA or an abatement action
under RCRA). One court declined to enforce the CWA bar on civil penalties where the
administrative action sought compliance but not penalties. See Washington Public Interest
Research Group v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, 11 F.3d 883, 886 (9th Cir. 1993).
60. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. S 7604(b)(1)(B) (CAA); 42
U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i) (CERCLA); 42 U.S.C.
11046(h)(2) (EPCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(b)(1)(B) (SDWA).
61. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c)(2) (CAA); 42
U.S.C. § 6972(c)(2) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 965 9 (g) (CERCLA); 42 U.S.C. 5 11046(h)(1)
(EPCRA); 42 U.S.C. 5 300j-8(c)(2) SDWA).
62. See Cascade Conservation League v. M.A. Segale, Inc. 921 E Supp. 692, 696
(WD.Wash. 1996) (holding Congress waived the United States' sovereign immunity as to
EPA's actions by the CWA citizen suit provision).
63. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a)(2) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (CAA); 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(2) (CERCLA); 42 U.S.C.
11046(a)(1)(B) (EPCRA) (specified duties); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a)(2) SDWA).
64. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2000).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (2000).
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miss the CWA deadline by 63 months,66 and the CAA deadline by 69
months.67 Those delays postponed development of the tribal self-
government interests Congress explicitly preferred for Indian country, con-
tributing to a regulatory gap risking tribes' health and welfare interests. An
environmental organization sued EPA for violating the CWA TAS deadline,
but the court said a tribal government would be the proper plaintiff to raise
the sovereignty interests at stake.
68
EPA's mandatory duties for setting national emission standards and
supervising delegated programs in and near Indian country can indirectly
preserve tribal health and welfare. Air pollutant emissions and water pollut-
ant discharges cannot be constrained until EPA promulgates national
standards for them, which are often mandated duties.69 EPA typically has a
non-discretionary duty to determine whether state delegated programs
comply with the national standards. 70 The Miccosukee Tribe brought a citi-
zen suit against EPA for failing to determine whether a new Florida law
revised previously approved state water quality standards for the Everglades'
ecosystem.71 If EPA determines a state's existing program falls short of na-
tional standards, it may have a mandatory duty to require the state revise its
program.72 Excessive state delays in submitting required program changes




66. Treatment of Indian Tribes as States for Purposes of Sections 308, 309, 401, 402,
and 405 of the Clean Water Act, 58 Fed. Reg. 67,966 (Dec. 22, 1993) (codified in 40
C.FR. pts. 122-124, and 501); Clean Water Act; Section 404 Tribal Regulations, 58 Fed.
Reg. 8172 (Feb. 11, 1993) (codified in 40 C.FR. pts. 232,233).
67. Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. 7254 (Feb.
12, 1998) (codified at 40 C.FR. pts. 9,35,49,50, and 81).
68. See Citizens Interested in Bull Run, Inc. v. Reilly, No. 91-36119, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10386 at *5-7 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 1993). No tribes sued EPA to compel TAS prom-
ulgation.
69. E.g., Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F Supp. 165, 175 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (directing
EPA discharge its non-discretionary duty to promulgate nitrogen oxide regulations due in
1979).
70. E.g., Scott, 741 F.2d at 997-98 (CWA total maximum daily loads).
71. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, Environmental Protection
Agency, 105 E3d 599 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
72. E.g., NRDC v. N.Y Dept. of Envd. Conservation, 700 E Supp. 173, 177
(S.D.N.Y 1988) (finding a non-discretionary duty to set a deadline for revision of a state
implementation plan once EPA finds it substantially inadequate).
73. See, e.g., Scott, 741 F2d at 998 (holding the State's several year delay in address-
ing CWA provisions governing waters of limited quality amounted to a constructive non-
submission triggering EPA's mandatory duty to promulgate federal total maximum daily
loads); Alaska Center for the Env't v. Reilly, 796 E Supp. 1374, 1377 (WD. Wash. 1992)
(holding the State's thirteen-year failure to address CWA provisions governing waters of
limited quality amounted to a constructive non-submission triggering EPA'S mandatory
duty to promulgate federal total maximum daily loads).
74. See, e.g., Idaho Sportsmen's Coal. v. EPA, 951 E Supp. 962, 966-67 (WD. Wash.
1996) (rejecting EPA'S proposed twenty-five year schedule for promulgation of total
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The distinction between these kinds of mandatory duty suits and
others involving the exercise of agency discretion is "abstract and concep-
tual," but also jurisdictional." Non-discretionary citizen suits may not
challenge discretionary agency actions, though the two are often bound
up. An Administrator's duty to set national standards may not become
mandatory until EPA makes a discretionary threshold finding of harm. 6
The Administrator's mandatory duty to issue regulations in the first in-
stance may not have a specified deadline," or may not include
modifications sought later."' The Jicarilla and Navajo Nations sued EPA
after it declined their request to strengthen national standards applicable
to proposed coal-fired power plants in the Four Corners region. The
court dismissed the Tribes' citizen suit, finding the Administrator's duty to
determine whether allegedly new evidence justified revision of a standard
was discretionary 9
Of course, these decisions do not foreclose all legal remedies where
federal agency action impairs tribal interests.8 ° Although their citizen suit
failed, the court noted the Jicarilla and Navajo Nations could claim viola-
tion of the CAA provision governing standards revisions and the federal
Administrative Procedures Act's abuse of discretion standard.8 ' Similarly,
tribes' health and welfare interests are usually sufficient to intervene when
other parties bring these types of cases. The Warm Springs Tribes inter-
vened in an environmental group's suit challenging the Forest Service's
maximum daily loads for water quality limited waters); Idaho Conservation League v. EPA,
968 F Supp. 546, 549 (WD. Wash. 1997) (holding EPA has a mandatory duty to promul-
gate federal water quality standards promptly after disapproving state standards); Sierra
Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 796-97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding plaintiffi could make an
APA claim for EPA's unreasonable delay in deciding whether to place strip mines on its
list of pollutant sources subject to fugitive emissions regulation, which would fall within
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals).
75. Sierra Club v. Norton, 313 F Supp. 2d 1291, 1294 (S.D.Ala. 2004) (citing Oljato
Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v.Train, 515 F2d 654,663 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
76. E.g., NRDC v. Thomas, 689 F Supp. 246,254 (S.D.N.Y 1988) (rejecting citizen
suit to compel EPA listing of certain substances as hazardous air pollutants until the
Agency made a threshold determination of harm, which was discretionary).
77. Cf. Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F2d 783, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding no non-
discretionary duty for EPA to determine whether to regulate fugitive emissions from strip
mines where no deadline could be readily ascertained from CAA).
78. See Oljato, 515 F2d at 661.
79. Id.
80. Tribes also may invoke the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act
requiring federal actors assess the environmental consequences of their proposed major
actions. See, e.g.,Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, 621 E2d 269, 270 (8th Cir. 1980);
Colorado Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F Supp. 1425,1427 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
81. See Oljato, 515 F2d at 663-66. See also Montana Power Co. v. EPA and North-
ern Cheyenne Tribe, 429 E Supp. 683, 694 (D. Mont. 1977) (addressing an APA claim
challenging EPA's implementation of tribal standards brought by an affected air pollution
source).
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issuance of grazing permits without certification that state water quality
standards would be protected.12 The Navajo Nation intervened in a state's
challenge to federal regulations for mining on Indian lands.13 But, by their
nature as reviews of discretionary decisions, cases like these tend to be less
successful because of judicial deference to agency views on complex
regulatory questions. Some courts, however, find the federal government's
trust responsibility limits agency discretion.
4
C. Suits Against Regulated Entities for Pollution Violations
The second type of citizen suit more effectively controls localized,
facility-specific impacts. These claims directly prosecute persons or facili-
ties for violating specific effluent limitations, standards, or permit
requirements. s They are generally brought in the district where the viola-
tion occurred or the source is located.
86
Statutory and regulatory violations vulnerable to citizen suits are as
broad as the environmental programs they represent. Generally, any failure
by a regulated entity to comply with effluent limitations, control technol-
ogy requirements, permit conditions, or other applicable substantive
standards, is actionable under the citizen suit provisions. For example, a
citizen might file suit against a company for failing to file required moni-
toring reports, 7 discharging pollutants into surface waters without a
permit,88 emitting pollutants in excess of permit limitations, 9 or building
82. Oregon Natural Desert Assoc. v. Dombeck, 172 F3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 1998)
(finding state certification not required by the CWA).
83. New Mexico v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 820 F2d 441, 442-44 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
84. See, e.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton 354 E Supp. 252, 256
(D. D.C. 1972) (rejecting the Department of the Interior's "judgment call" balancing the
competing interests of an Indian tribe and adjacent water users); Northwest Sea Farms,
Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 931 F Supp. 1515, 1520 (WD. Wash. 1996) (finding
agency's denial of fish farm permit in tribal treaty fishing area consistent with the federal
trust responsibility).
85. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (CAA); 42
U.S.C. § 6 9 72(a)(1) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1) (CERCLA); 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1)
(EPCRA) (for specified violations); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a)(1) SDWA).
86. E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(1) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c)(1) (CAA); 42 U.S.C.
§6972(a) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(b)(1) (CERCLA); 42 U.S.C. § 11046(b)(1)
(EPCRA) (for specified violations).
87. E.g., Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 E2d 1109, 1110-11 (4th Cir. 1988)
(allowing CWA citizen suit to proceed on claims of company's failure to file required
quarterly discharge reports).
88. E.g., Espanola Mercantile, 72 F3d at 831 (addressing CWA citizen suit for un-
permitted water discharges).
89. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 E2d at 1518 (9th Cir. 1987) (addressing
CWA citizen suit for water discharges exceeding permit conditions); Powell Duffryn, 913
E2d at 68-69 (same).
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a new source of air pollution without required permits or in excess of
permit conditions. °
For example, the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes filed a CWA
citizen suit against a company responsible for water pollution from an
abandoned mine located outside the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation.91
The San Juan Pueblo filed suit against a metropolitan transit center for its
unpermitted water pollutant discharges .92
Tribes may have other claims directly affecting polluting actors. The
Quapaw Tribe's interests were affected by water discharges from aban-
doned mining operations. The Tribe brought suit in parens patriae under
the common law doctrine of public trust against the successors-in-interest
of the mine operator to redress the resulting contamination.
93
The Puyallup Tribe and the Muckeshoot Tribe brought suit against
former and current owners of a pulp and paper mill for hazardous sub-
stance releases into a marine embayment where the Tribes possess treaty
rights.94 Their claim was authorized by CERCLA, which designates tribes
as trustees for natural resources "belonging to, managed by, controlled by,
or appertaining to such tribe, or held in trust for the benefit of such tribe,
or belonging to a member of such tribe if such resources are subject to a
trust restriction on alienation[.] ' '95 CERCLA also authorizes recovery of
costs tribes incur in conducting removal or remedial actions for releases of
hazardous substances. 96 The Oil Pollution Act contains similar provisions
for tribal natural resource damages and cost recovery for remedial actions
arising from oil spills into navigable waters or shorelines.97
These claims and citizen suits can often reach pollution generated
by governmental facilities as well. Except for the Oil Pollution Act,98
Congress has waived the federal government's sovereign immunity from
suit in this context. 99 Congress also included state agencies and facilities in
the citizen suit provisions, but the Court has held Congress' Commerce
90. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(3).
91. See GrosVentre Tribe, Assiniboine Tribe, Fort Belknap Community Council, and
Island Mountain Protectors Ass'n v. Pegasus Gold Corp. and Zortman Mining, No. 95-96-
BLG-JDS (D. Mont.) (filed July 24, 1996).
92. Espanola Mercantile, 72 F.3d at 831.
93. Berrey, 439 F3d. at 640.
94. Notice of Lodging of Consent Decree Pursuant to the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and the Clean Water Act, 60 Fed.
Reg. 65,669-01 (Dec. 20, 1995).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
97. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1)(A), (2)(A).
98. Id. at § 2701(32) (excepting federal and state instrumentalities).
99. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1) (CERCLA); 42
U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (CAA); 42 U.S.C. § 6 972(a)(1) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1)
(EPCRA) (for specified violations); 42 U.S.C. 5 300j-8(a)(1) SDWA); United States Dept.
of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607,613 (1992) (finding waivers in RCRA and CWA).
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Clause power does not include abrogating state sovereign immunity pre-
served by the 11th Amendment.'00 The Court has also said that the 11th
Amendment bars suits by tribes without state consent.''
D. Possible Remedies
Citizen suits offer several types of relief that can serve tribal sover-
eignty interests. Judicial orders and private settlement agreements can halt
or change ongoing actions harming tribal health or welfare interests, pro-
vide for civil monetary penalties, and award litigation costs including
attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs. Perhaps most significantly, though,
favorable citizen suits can restore damaged tribal ecosystems, and through
oversight of restoration projects, can help tribes develop regulatory capac-
ity for later program assumptions, thus supporting tribal self-government
interests.
1. Injunctions, Civil Penalties and Litigation Costs
Of course, the point of a citizen suit is to stop action or inaction
perceived as harming or threatening the plaintiff's interests. Where the
plaintiff proves a statutory violation, the environmental statutes confer
jurisdiction on federal courts to order EPA to discharge its mandatory
duties. °2 Courts have directed EPA to issue regulations, 3 set standards,0 4
make compliance determinations on state programs,' and replace defec-
tive state programs. 10 6 The statutes also authorize judicial orders enforcing
effluent limitations or standards violated by the defendant facility. 7
Courts could order facilities to clean up toxic wastes illegally disposed'
08
100. Seminole Tribe ofFla v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 114 (1996).
101. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775,782 (1991).
102. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. 5 7604(a) (CAA); 42 U.S.C.
6972(a) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (CERCLA); 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a) (EPCRA) (for
specified violations); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a) (SDWA).
103. See, e.g., Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 884 F2d 648, 651 (2nd Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
104. E.g., Sierra Club v.Thomas, 658 F. Supp. 165 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (air quality standards).
105. E.g., Scott, 741 F2d at 998.
106. See, e.g., Scott, 741 F2d at 998 (finding state inaction triggered federal duty to
develop maximum water pollution loads); Alaska Cntr. for the Env't v. Browner, 20 F3d
981,987 (9th Cir. 1994) (same).
107. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (CAA); 42 U.S.C.
6972(a) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (CERCLA); 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a) (EPCRA) (for
specified violations); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a) (SDWA).
108. See, e.g., Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. 516 U.S. 479, 486 (1996) (noting
RCRA's citizen suit authorizes injunctions for remediation of hazardous wastes presenting
an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment); Gache v.Town
of Harrison, 813 F Supp. 1037, 1044 (S.D.N.Y 1993).
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and refrain from future illegal activities."° But proving a violation does
not mean that a permanent injunction necessarily follows.10
Citizen suit provisions commonly authorize courts to assess mone-
tary civil penalties against regulated facilities for environmental
violations."' Potential penalties are not insubstantial for repeated viola-
tions. The main regulatory statutes set a relatively modest maximum civil
penalty (generally $25,000), but the ceiling applies on a per violation per
day basis.I 2 The deterrent effect may be slight for a one-time incident, but
for a facility whose regular on-going operations violate applicable stan-
dards the possible maximum penalty can be mind-boggling. " 3 The
prospect of huge penalties presumably serves a deterrence function,"' and
may bring defendants to the bargaining table sooner. However, courts
have wide discretion in awarding penalties, and even in EPA prosecutions
penalties rarely approach the authorized maximum. 15 Courts may not
necessarily order penalties for every violation proven. 6 If assessed, penal-
ties are paid to the U.S. Treasury and thus do not necessarily benefit the
environment affected by the defendant's illegal activity."7 And civil penal-
ties do not apply to federal instrumentalities without Congressional
109. E.g., Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Co., 73 F3d 546 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 811 (1996).
110. See, Marsh, 884 F2d at 651.
111. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (CAA); 42 U.S.C.
6972(a) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (CERCLA); 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a) (EPCRA) (for
specified violations); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a) (SDWA).
112. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. 1319(d) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (CAA); 42 U.S.C.
§ 69 2 8(g) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 11045(a) (EPCRA) (for specified violations); 42 U.S.C.
§ 300h-2(b)(1) (SDWA) (specified civil penalties).
113. E.g., Sierra Club v. Pub. Serv. Co. Colo., 894 E Supp. 1455, 1456 (D. Colo. 1995)
(19,000 alleged violations over a 5-year period, triggering a potential maximum penalty of
$475 million).
114. See Laidlaw Envt'l Servs., 528 U.S. at 187.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Roll Coater, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (BNA) 21,073, 21,074
(C. S.D. Ind. 1991) (approximately 37% of maximum penalty); United States v. Smithfield
Foods, Inc., 972 F Supp. 338 (E.D.Va. 1997) (approximately 7% of maximum penalty).
116. See, e.g., Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc., 909 F2d 1350,
1354 (9th Cir. 1990) (approving consent decree settling a CWA citizen suit although it did
not provide for a civil penalty to be paid to the Treasury); Hawaii's Thousand Friends v.
City and County of Honolulu, 149 ER.D. 614,617 (D. Hawaii 1993).
117. E.g., Powell Duffiyn Terminals, 913 E2d 64 (holding defendants' monetary pay-
ments, which a court-approved settlement agreement labeled as penalties, could only be
paid to the U.S.Treasury).
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waiver." 8 They also do not apply to suits against EPA for failure to per-
form non-discretionary duties."1 9
Recouping litigation expenses offers a more direct benefit to tribal
citizen suit plaintiffs than penalties assessed on defendants. The statutes
commonly authorize courts to award "costs of litigation (including rea-
sonable attorneys' fees and expert witness fees)." 2' Such costs might
include costs incurred in the course of administrative proceedings perti-
nent to the case."' Some statutes authorize cost awards to the prevailing
or substantially prevailing parties,122 and others allow awards to any party
for which the court feels an award would be appropriate. 2 3 The standard
probably differs for parties who prevail as defendants or interveners. The
Tulalip Tribes prevailed as a defendant in a RCRA citizen suit but the
court rejected their claim for attorneys' fees because the plaintiff's claims
were not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. 24 The Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe prevailed as an intervening defendant in an Endangered
Species Act citizen suit, but the court denied its claim for attorney fees,
finding other parties had energetically litigated the same issue raised by
the Tribe.1 2 The Pueblo of San Juan also prevailed as an intervener in a
citizen suit, but its failure to provide the plaintiff with required advance
notice precluded its attorneys' fees claim.
126
2. Supplemental Environmental Projects
The primary remedy sought in citizen suits against operating facili-
ties is usually an injunction constraining future violations. Such an order
helps avert the direct harm caused by continued illegal releases, but may
not address harm already caused, nor its relation to an ecosystem's health
in light of other pollution sources. Those issues can be targeted, however,
118. Cf U.S. Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992) (holding the CWA's and
RCRA'S provisions for federal compliance were not unequivocal waivers for civil penalties
designed to punish the government for past violations), with Fed. Facility Compliance Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, § 102(a), 106 Stat. 1505, 1506 (1992) (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 6961(a) to waive federal immunity from civil penalties under RCRA).
119. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (CAA).
120. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. 1365(d) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (CAA); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(e) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(o (CERCLA); 42 U.S.C. § 11046() (EPCRA) (for
specified violations); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d) (SDWA).
121. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S.
546 (1986) (CAA).
122. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (RCRA).
123. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (CAA); 42 U.S.C. 300j-8(d) (SDWA).
124. Razore v. Tulalip Tribes ofWashington, 66 F3d 236, 240-41 (9th Cir. 1995).
125. Carson-Truckee Water Conservation District v. Secretary of the Interior, 748
F2d 523,526 (9th Cir. 1984).
126. Espanola Mercantile, 72 E3d at 833 (rejecting Pueblo's claim despite notice
given by a co-plaintifl).
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through the remedy of a supplemental environmental project (SEP). A
SEP is a beneficial environmental project supplemental to the defendant's
regulatory obligations. Well-designed SEPs offer potentially significant
benefits to tribal health and welfare and self-government interests.
Unlike civil penalties that are paid into the U.S. Treasury,'27 supple-
mental environmental projects focus on the environment affected by the
illegal action. Their primary function is to improve, protect, or reduce
risks to public health or the environment at large.' EPA categorizes ac-
ceptable SEPs under the labels Public Health, Pollution Prevention,
Pollution Reduction, Environmental Restoration and Protection, Facility
Audits, Industry Compliance Training, and Emergency Preparedness.'29
Relevant to tribal suits, EPA posits environmental justice as a goal over-
arching all categories of SEPs, and particularly encourages SEPs in
communities where environmental justice may be an issue. 3 '
Courts approve SEPs in settlement agreements if they are reasonable,
equitable and do not violate law or public policy.3' A SEP must have an
adequate nexus with the harm caused by the illegal actions.3 2 Settlements
may require the defendant finance SEPs undertaken by the citizen suit
plaintiff or other non-federal entities.'33
The wide variety of SEPs can have important benefits for tribal
health and welfare interests. Common SEPs seek restoration of damaged
areas,' or replacement where restoration is impracticable. 13  SEPs
127. The 1990 amendments to the CAA specify that penalties received from citizen
suits are to be dedicated for air compliance and enforcement activities. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(g)(1). Up to $100,000 may be paid in lieu of penalties for SEPs. Id. at § 7 604(g)(2 ).
128. Interim Revised EPA Supplemental Envtl. Projects Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,856,
24,857 (May 10, 1995) [hereinafter SEP Policy].
129. Id. at 24,858-59.
130. Id. at 24,857, 24,861.
131. E.g., Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc., 909 F2d 1350, 1355
(9th Cir. 1990). Only the CAA specifically authorizes courts to order SEPs, see 42 U.S.C.
7604(g)(2), but courts routinely approve settlement agreements containing SEPs.
132. See, e.g., United States v. Roll Coater, Inc., 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (BNA) 21073,
21077-78 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (finding sufficient nexus); Pennsylvania Envtl. Def. Found. v.
Bellefonte Borough, 718 E Supp. 431,437 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (finding insufficient nexus).
133. See, e.g., Ad. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg., 18 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 2395,2396 (D. Minn. 1988) (reaching such a settlement under the CWA);Atl.
States Legal Found., Inc. v. Simco Leather Corp., 755 F Supp. 59, 61 (N.D.N.Y. 1991)
(reaching such a settlement under the CWA).
134. See, e.g., N.W Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Unified Sewerage Agency of Wash. County, 21
Envtl. L. Rep. 20,676 (D. Or. 1990) (approving settlement establishing $900,000 restora-
tion fund for affected river); Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Upjohn Co., 21 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 9 (D. Conn. 1990) (reporting settlement establishing $1.2 million trust fund for
river cleanup).
135. See, e.g., Sierra Club, Inc. v. Port Townsend Paper Corp., 19 Env't Rep. (BNA)
1434, 1434-35 (WD.Wash. 1987) (reporting settlement requiring payment of $137,500 to
the Nature Conservancy to buy replacement wetlands); Sierra Club v. Pub. Serv. Co. Colo.,
Michigan journal of Race & Law
sometimes address damaged areas by seeking to decrease other sources of
pollution affecting the damaged area, 136  and increase related
enforcement.'37
SEPs may also indirectly benefit tribal self-government interests.
Development of effective tribal health and environmental programs re-
quires reliable data. SEPs can offer an opportunity to collect and assemble
important baseline data on human health138 and environmental quality in
formats usable for later program development and operation. 39 The data
needs of the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes benefited significantly
from a CWA citizen suit against the owner of an off-reservation aban-
doned mine. The Tribes' settlement included SEP provisions for two
multi-year studies expected to cost over $500,000.1' One would focus on
the pathways by which Reservation residents were exposed to contami-
nants and the impacts of that exposure. The other study would assess the
health of the Reservation's aquatic ecosystem, specifically for the purpose
of establishing trends in water and sediment quality.
Tribal governmental infrastructure and capacity can also be served
by SEPs."' The Gros Ventre SEP provided for over $1.5 million of im-
provements to drinking water systems for several Fort Peck Reservation
communities and housing developments. 142 It also involved tribal staff and
tribal college students in the aquatic study, potentially increasing tribal
environmental management capability. In a similar vein, a citizen suit in
Inc., No. 93-B-1749 (D. Colo. May 5, 1996) (consent decree lodged) ($2,000,000 for pur-
chase of lands and/or conservation easements to protect and enhance air quality and
related values).
136. E.g., Pub. Serv. Co. Colo., No. 93-B-1749 ($250,000 for conversion of vehicles
and wood stoves in the area to natural gas).
137. E.g., N.W Envtl. Def. Ctr., 21 Env't L. Rep. 20,676 (reporting settlement that
included $100,000 payment to the State to fund additional CWA enforcement actions).
138. EPA'S SEP policy envisions SEPs that provide diagnostic, preventative and/or
remedial human health care related to the violation, including analyzing epidemiological
data and conducting medical examinations of persons affected. SEP Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. at
24,858. Additionally, tribes can seek TAS status for conducting health assessments on re-
leases of hazardous substances covered by CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9626(a) (stating that
EPA may treat tribes as states for purposes of section 104(i) regarding health authorities);
42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(15) (allowing health assessments by states that show capacity).
139. See, e.g., Minnesota Mining and Mfg., 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 2396 (reporting
settlement including development of water quality computer database); Simco Leather
Corp., 755 F Supp. at 61 (reporting settlement including study of water pollution sources).
140. E.g., Gros Ventre Tribe, No. 95-96-BLG-JDS at 40-45.
141. Although not technically a SEP, the institutional capacity of the Oglala Sioux
Tribe benefited from a setdement agreement promising additional EPA support for the
Tribe's water quality management efforts. Tripp Baltz, Agency to Assist South Dakota Tribe
With Contamination Problems in River, 30 ENVT. REP. 986 (1999) (describing settlement of
the Tribe's CWA suit against EPA for failing to require the State of South Dakota to iden-
tify water quality-impaired waters).
142. Gros Ventre Tribe, No. 95-96-BLG-JDS at 45-47.
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Alaska included as a SEP college scholarships for Alaska Natives studying
natural resource management." 3 SEPs might also assist tribal governments
in developing emergency preparedness capacity,' and educating the tribal
community on pollution prevention.4 5
Ill.TRIBAL CITIZEN SUITS As SOVEREIGN ACTIONS
Violations of federal environmental laws can threaten important
tribal health and welfare interests inside and adjacent to Indian country.
Reactive tribal suits seeking compliance are narrower in scope than pro-
spective regulatory programs, but they can stop further illegal injuries,
avoid future harm, and restore damaged ecosystems. Thus, like program-
matic actions, tribal citizen suits help discharge the tribe's public trust
responsibility for maintaining interests important to tribal welfare.4 6 In
this sense, prosecution of tribal citizen suits can be understood as an exer-
cise of inherent tribal sovereignty.
Of course, a tribe's ability to use the citizen suit tool originates in
federal not tribal law. But governmental sovereignty is not limited to one's
legislatively enacted value judgments. The Court long ago rejected the
view that a government seeking to benefit from associating with another
thereby waives its inherent sovereignty. 4' The treaty era contains hundreds
of examples of tribes making sovereign decisions whether and under what
terms to ally with the United States and thereby benefit (on occasion)
from federal law. More recently, tribes have elected in several hundred
tribal TAS applications to amplify their environmental value judgments
through incorporation with federal command and control regulatory pro-
grams.
Perhaps more relevant here are the many times state governments
have invoked federal law to protect their environmental interests. No
one would suggest a state somehow waives its sovereignty by seeking a
federal common law remedy against interstate pollution,4 8 using federal
143. NRDC v. ARCO Alaska, Inc., 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 12 (D. Alaska 1993).
144. See SEP Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. at 24,859 (SEP could provide equipment and/or
training to emergency response or planning entities (including tribes) charged by the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act with assessing the dangers of
hazardous chemicals present at facilities within their jurisdiction, developing emergency
response plans, and training emergency response personnel to better respond to chemical
spills).
145. Minnesota Mining and Mfg., 18 Env't Rep. at 2396.
146. See, e.g., Berrey, 439 E3d at 640 n.1 (tribal claims in parens patriae under public
trust doctrine against the owner of an abandoned mine for contamination of tribal fee
lands).
147. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
148. E.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103-04 (1972) (noting judicial power to
fashion federal common law remedies for a state's claim against pollution originating in
another state, unless preempted by Congress).
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restrictions on interstate pollution to challenge another state's program149
or proposed permit."' The same seems true for citizen suits filed by
states' and their subdivisions.
5 2
Likewise, a tribe's decision to invoke federal citizen suit provisions
implicates sovereign concerns at multiple levels. Absent an unusual citizen
referendum, the tribe's legislative body undertakes that decision as the
people's chosen representative. An immediate sovereignty question arises
as to whether the tribe's citizens delegated to that governmental body a
general health and welfare power. The scope of any such delegated power,
and the principles guiding its valid exercises, are relevant sovereignty is-
sues.
These questions raise the same human health and general welfare
considerations inherent in developing and administering environmental
regulatory programs: identifying known or anticipated negative impacts
from the proposed activity; evaluating the relation of those impacts to le-
gitimate tribal health and welfare interests; comparing the efficacy of
alternatives for mitigating or avoiding significant harms; assessing available
financial and other resources necessary to take action; and determining
the relative priority of these concerns among other important tribal inter-
ests.
These governmental deliberations take place in a broader context
that reflects their sovereign nature. For some tribes, one alternative to a
citizen suit may be to use existing tribal regulatory programs, developed
and administered as sovereign control mechanisms. The majority of tribes,
however, lack existing regulatory infrastructure. For them, a citizen suit is
a rudimentary tribal environmental program of sorts; the tribe steps into a
temporary regulatory-like role administered on a site-specific or facility-
specific basis. The tribe does not set the initial requirements, but it does
influence whether and how they are enforced, and those decisions stem
from the tribe's assessment of risks to self-government interests.
Tribal citizen suits can also help build institutional capacity for later
program assumptions. Preparing and prosecuting the case will likely ex-
pand tribal experience with federal environmental law and policy, and the
complex science behind them. Negotiations with defendants, EPA and
state agencies open lines of communication important for effective tribal
149. E.g.,Air Pollution Control Dist. of Jefferson County, Kentucky v. EPA, 739 E2d
1071 (6th Cir. 1984) (seeking EPA order for reduction of emissions by Indiana power
plant); New York v. EPA, 710 E2d 1200 (6th Cit. 1983) (challenging EPA's approval of
Tennessee's anti-pollution plan); State of Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F2d 147 (2nd Cir. 1982)
(challenging EPA's approval of NewYork's anti-pollution program).
150. E.g.,Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
151. E.g., United States Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
152. See JACKSON B. BATTLE & MAXINE I. LIPELES,WATER POLLUTION 514 (1998) (dis-
cussing 14 citizen suits filed by the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District against
facilities making indirect dischargers to the District's treatment works).
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programs, and provide venues for increasing respect among the partici-
pants and thus perhaps decreasing the chance of challenges to future tribal
program implementation.
Supplemental environmental projects may help address tribal re-
source limitations hindering program development. SEP studies on the
impacts of violations on particular ecosystems can provide equipment and
training for tribal environmental agencies useful for broader environ-
mental issues. Conducting studies and restoration projects builds tribal
administrative experience, and hence capacity, as well as demonstrating
the tribe's commitment to environmental management pertinent to later
TAS program applications.
These incremental steps toward fuller environmental management,
and the direct health and welfare benefits they serve, support characteriz-
ing a tribe's prosecution of a citizen suit as an inherent sovereignty
exercise. It also can be seen as a strategic means to protect important self-
government interests without putting sovereignty at risk. Direct tribal
regulation of non-Indian polluters raises several uncertain federal Indian
law questions. Tribal officials and advocates are apprehensive over the
shrinking scope of inherent tribal sovereignty and the diminishing size of
Indian country under the Supreme Court's recent cases.Yet, other tribal
interests are still vulnerable and in need of protection.
Tribal citizen suits offer a measure of environmental control without
putting sovereignty at stake. The gravamen of a citizen suit is that the de-
fendant violated federal law by failing to comply with applicable standards
or requirements. An unsuccessful citizen suit merely means the defendant
did not violate federal law, or the tribe did not prove the violation.
Whether the tribe possesses inherent regulatory authority over the defen-
dant is immaterial. Also unrelated is whether the defendant's activities
occurred in Indian country. Hence, a tribe who initiates a citizen suit
against an on-reservation polluter does not put sovereignty at risk as it
may in seeking TAS program assumption.
A corollary value of citizen suits is their ability to reach areas outside
Indian country. Historical pressures forced tribes to cede huge portions of
their aboriginal lands to the United States. Some of those lands contain
sites and resources of continuing cultural and religious significance."5 3 In
many instances, tribes' uses of these sites and resources are protected by
treaty, but because they are outside Indian country, tribes may not regulate
activities of non-Indians negatively affecting them. But tribal jurisdiction
is not a hindrance to a citizen suit. Where compliance with federal re-
quirements helps protect tribal interests outside Indian country, a tribal
153. E.g., Lyng v. N.W Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 442-43
(1988) (three tribes filed CWA and other claims challenging timber sales in aboriginal
territories).
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citizen suit is an important exercise of sovereign responsibility and au-
thority.
CONCLUSION
The existence of any government's inherent sovereignty is premised
on an expectation that the governmental body will take any and all le-
gitimate actions perceived necessary for protecting the citizens' interests.
Subject to constitutional or other tribal law constraints, tribal govern-
ments presumably assume responsibility for Indian country human health
and environmental quality. Failing to consider citizen suits and other re-
lated claims as a means serving those ends might be considered an
abdication of a tribe's sovereign responsibilities.
The direct compliance control over a particular facility offered by
citizen suits can benefit tribal health and welfare substantially. Unpermit-
ted or excessive pollution from operating and abandoned sources could
be curbed or mitigated, health and environmental quality data useful for
later program actions could be obtained, and ecosystems damaged by pol-
lution could be restored or replaced. Knowledge and experience gained
through those ventures could help build tribal infrastructure and tribal
management capacity. Institutional competence is the key to creating
comprehensive regulatory programs that operate prospectively across a
wider range of polluting actions.
Citizen suits are retroactive, violation-specific claims. They are not
programmatic approaches to achieving strategic goals. But they can act as
a sort of substitute or interim program for particular violators where a
regulatory gap otherwise exists. They are not hindered or threatened by
judicial limitations on the extent of tribal sovereignty or Indian country.
The initial investment of time and money is likely more favorable, and the
suit can contribute directly to later program development. And signifi-
cantly, tribal citizen suits may serve continuing tribal uses of ceded
territories outside Indian country.
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